We appear to be unaware of large changes in our visual scene if our attention is temporarily diverted. This suggests that the rich, complete visual scene that we appear to have may be just an illusion.
As I gaze around my office, looking for inspiration as to how to start this article, I have the impression of a complete and rich scene, and that I am aware of each of the many items that clutter my room. If someone were to take my coffee cup(s) to wash, or rearrange the pile of 'to be read' reprints, whilst I blinked or temporarily glanced elsewhere, I would surely notice such a change. But recent experiments suggest that this apparent perceptual richness is all an illusion -large, dramatic alterations of a visual scene can occur without our awareness if the mechanism by which attention is normally drawn to the changes is somehow compromised.
A particularly vivid example of this general phenomenon has recently been reported by O'Regan et al. [1] . They presented people with a 'realistic' scene, such as the picture of my desk in Figure 1 , followed immediately by the same scene with some aspect of it altered (Figure 1b) . The observer has to 'spot the difference' -just as in the comic-book games we enjoyed as children. With just this simple change, the observers had no problem and detected the change immediately. But this was not the case when the change was accompanied by 'mudsplashes' -patches of grey that were well away from the site of the change between the two versions of the picture, and that the subjects knew were irrelevant and should be ignored (as in Figure 1c , with pink mudsplashes). These mudsplashes had a devastating effect on performanceon many occasions, the observer would fail to detect the picture change after 40 seconds (over eight alternations between the scenes). But once spotted, such changes seem impossible not to see, even with the mudsplashes. So why do the mudsplashes stop the change being detected in the first place?
The results suggest that we do not have a complete internal representation of the visual scene we are looking at, as large changes may go unnoticed. What we may have is an extremely sparse representation, with only the information from the focus of attention available to us. Considering again the example of Figure 1 , we seem to solve this task by attending to the information about one part of the scene -let us say the coffee mug -and then going to the other picture to see if this is the same. This deliberate, wilful moving of attention from location to location is termed 'endogenous attention', and once it has arrived at the appropriate location it allows us to see the scene changes even in the presence of mudsplashes.
There is, however, another way in which our attention can be shifted to an area of interest -by exogenous or stimulus-driven cues. For example, the sudden appearance of a student in my doorway, or the clatter of falling books, may automatically bring my attention to bear at the location of this kerfuffle. It appears that visual transients -such as a change in luminance in some part of the scene -are particularly good at attracting attention, and the shifting of the pen and the white-out (how many spotted that!) cause such transients and hence attracts my attention. But the mudsplashes also cause transients and compete for attention; as they are many and large, the mudsplashes may often win in the battle to attract attention, so that attention does not alight on the crucial change which is consequently missed.
Such a theory would suggest that other ways of destroying this exogenous attention shift would produce similar 'change blindness'. It is well documented that change detectors -the neurons that signal visual motionoperate over a small time interval of no more than one tenth of a second [2, 3] . Hence, the introduction of a small blank interval between the frames should have the same effect as the mudsplashes, and this has indeed been found to be the case [4] . Perhaps, then, other brief 'blanks' would also produce blindness to such image changes. One such blank occurs whenever we blink our eyes, and so if we were to produce our image changes at the very moment people blink they should be extremely poor at spotting such changes (they should only notice the change if they happened to be attending to that bit of the image just before the blink). Again, the results of such experiments confirm this idea [5] . Finally, another blank in our perception occurs approximately 170,000 times a day as our eyes flick from position to position -the socalled saccadic eye movements -while we examine the visual world. Again, large changes in scenes appear to go unnoticed if they are synchronised to the saccadic shifts of the eye [6, 7] .
This rich complete world I claim to see might thus be an illusion created by a series of successive samples of the image, and really I know little other than the point at which my attention happens to be. Again, O'Regan et al. [1] have illustrated the point persuasively. They simply had observers view a scene, and then placed a mudsplash over some part and asked the observer what is now under the mudsplash. In line with the notion that our knowledge of a visual scene at any moment is actually very limited, the observers were very poor at identifying the now hidden object. Again, try this for yourself. Closely observe Figure 1a and then rapidly shift gaze to Figure 1d -what was under the yellow block?
If we are indeed unable to report these seemingly obvious stimulus features, where is the 'problem' occurring? Do we simply not encode anything of the non-attended features so that, without changes to guide us, we have but a small aperture of attention through which to peer? Do we carry out a rough analysis to extract some basic characteristics, but not details, of a visual scene? Or do we fully analyse all aspects of the scene but only place a small portion into our realm of consciousness? The first of these three possibilities seems unlikely. As I hunt for my keys upon my desk or as you hunted for the difference between the pictures of Figure 1 , our eyes move from object to object rather than to random positions -clearly then we must have some representation of these things before our attention alights upon them [8] .
Deciding between the second and third possibilities may be less straightforward. There is already evidence that quite complex information may be extracted from the 'unseen' parts of the image [9] , and that high level aspects of the target help determine whether it is seen. When we are at a noisy party, for instance, we normally 'hear' little of what is said by people other than the speaker to whom we are currently attending. But if our name is mentioned in one of these other conversations, this information seems to be readily detected. Similarly, Mack and Rock [10] have shown that our own name presented visually tends to break our change blindness far better than someone else's. Such high level influences do not, however, rule out lower level ones. My internal visual world may be considerably more impoverished than it appears to be. But why should I go to the trouble of constructing a complex detailed visual scene inside my head? There is, after all, a perfectly good one right in from of my eyes [11] !
